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Abstract: As a highly prolific legal mechanism that both predated and subsequently
found form amid the development of Anglo-American capitalist societies, the
modern-day trust operates across manifold private, commercial, domestic and
international spheres. As a consequence of their complex legal, economic and
political significance that informs, for example, the worlds of global corporate
finance as well as public pensions, trusts play a remarkably important role in
helping shape the wider socio-cultural domain of Anglo-American jurisdictions
and beyond. Yet trusts remain under- or ill-considered juridical sites in terms of
continuing critical-legal dialogues, and especially the dialogue between equity and
psychoanalysis. This article will explore how the trust mirrors or recreates in an
external juridical form the internal regulation of desire and enjoyment that occurs
within the psychic space of the subject-as-trustee. In particular, via duties and
obligations a trustee holds on behalf of the subject-as-beneficiary, and the resultant
breach that is said to occur when such duties and obligations are not met. Using two
key formulations this article will aim to assess the trustee as castrated bymeans of a
(re)interpretation and (re)imagination of some fundamental and formal aspects of
breach of trust from the perspective of psychoanalysis. The first formulation relates
to the continuous force of unconscious desire (the death drive) that pushes the
subject-as-trustee ever onwards towards the thing (das Ding) and surplus enjoyment
(jouissance), thus producing an (inevitable) affective paradox or trap in which the
trustee finds themselves caught. The second, albeit intimately connected with the
first, relates to the internal regulatory or prohibitive psychical mechanisms that
prevent or seek to prevent the subject-as-trustee from pushing past the limit on
enjoyment imposed by the pleasure principle. To be exact, a limit that has been
consciously and deliberately recreated in the trustmechanism, and by extension the
so-called “onerous” duties of the subject-as-trustee, as a means of preventing a
breach of trust.
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1 Introduction
As a highly prolific legal mechanism that both predated and subsequently found
form amid the development of Anglo-American capitalist societies, the modern-day
trust operates across manifold private, commercial, domestic and international
spheres. As a consequence of their complex legal, economic and political signifi-
cance that informs, for example, the worlds of global corporate finance as well as
public pensions, trusts play a remarkably important role in helping shape the wider
socio-cultural domain of Anglo-American jurisdictions and beyond. Yet they remain
under- or ill-considered juridical sites in terms of continuing critical-legal dialogues,
and especially the dialogue between equity and psychoanalysis. Of particular
interest in this article is how the trust mirrors or recreates in an external juridical
form the internal regulation of desire and enjoyment that occurs within the psychic
space of the subject-as-trustee. Especially in light of the duties and obligations that
a trustee holds on behalf of the subject-as-beneficiary, and the resultant breach that
is said to occur when such duties and obligations are not met. In short, why the
trustee must be castrated.
2 Psychoanalysis with trusts
Trusts are often defined in purposive and mechanical terms.1 As such, defini-
tions tend, beyond trusts confined to simply holding and retaining legal title
over property, to highlight the basis of investment upon which trusts are created
and upon which they rely.2 Insofar as investment informs trusts, as well as the
duties and obligations of the trustees that flow both from the general principles
of trust law and individual trust arrangements, this can be further delineated
into two categories. Firstly, a duty or obligation to facilitate the capital growth
and income potential of the trust fund. And secondly, a duty or obligation to
protect the beneficial interest – namely a beneficiary’s financial interest – from
imprudent levels of investment hazard or risk.3
1 The purpose a trust is expected to achieve remains an important consideration in its creation,
irrespective of the doctrinal issues that surround so-called “purpose trusts” (see Re Astor’s
Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch. 534). As F.W. Maitland states: “the trustee is bound to exercise his
rights on behalf of some other person or for the accomplishment of some purpose” (F.W.
Maitland, Equity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 50).
2 Jonathan Garton,Moffat’s Trusts Law, 6th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 443.
3 Lord Watson in Learoyd v Whiteley [1887] 12 App Cas 727 at 733.
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But behind the technicalities of such definitions lies the incontrovertible
role that trusts play within capitalist societies. That is, to facilitate on behalf
of trust beneficiaries a greater and more absolute enjoyment of financial
capital (via a range of investment methods and types). Moreover, enjoyment
that is augmented by virtue of being unfettered by inter alia the managerial
and administrative responsibilities that ordinarily accompany individual or
independent investors. On this basis trusts entrench and even amplify capi-
talist dogma, primarily through the creation of the peculiar capitalist sub-
jectivity embodied by the beneficiary who is free to enjoy and always primed
to demand more enjoyment. Further, the trustee who is burdened with the
onerous task of facilitating beneficial enjoyment must simultaneously dis-
avow any sense of their own enjoyment. In particular if that enjoyment is
held to breach: the general principles of trust law; the particular duties and
obligations of a trust arrangement; or, and perhaps most importantly in terms
of the morality of capitalist subjectivity, the duty or obligation not to oversee
or facilitate financial loss for the beneficiaries by either intentionally or
negligently devaluing the investment fund or appropriating the funds for
themselves.
Using two key formulations, this article will aim to (re)interpret and (re)
imagine some of the fundamental and formal aspects of breach of trust from
the perspective of psychoanalysis. The first relates to the continuous force of
unconscious desire (the death drive) that pushes the subject-as-trustee ever
onwards towards the thing (das Ding) and surplus enjoyment (jouissance), thus
producing an (inevitable) affective paradox or trap in which the trustee finds
themselves caught.
In accordance with the capitalist context informing modes of subjectivity
which are of interest to this article, das ding and jouissance ought to be under-
stood as primarily financial in nature, or at least financially-orientated. If, for
example, we take seriously the suggestion that beneficial interests are de facto
financial interests, as Megarry VC maintained in Cowen v Scargill, then the
conclusion tends towards das ding as equivalent to financial capital.4
Furthermore, jouissance must equate to the product or “fruits” of investments,
or indeed the potential fruits that one will only secure if willing to engage with
the risks. The palpable uncertainty of attaining any further fruit from high-risk
investments therefore informs the impossibility of jouissance as a corresponding
potential failure of investment strategy.
4 Megarry VC in Cowan v Scargill [1984] 2 All ER 750 at 760.
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Such a crude mapping of these things one atop the other, however, fails to
account for the more complex nature that Lacan accords to both das ding and
jouissance, with the latter of those proving especially difficult to define in any
concrete terms. “The specificity of jouissance is best established,” claims
Adrian Jonhston, “by contrasting it with the basic features of the pleasure
principle.”5 Johnston then continues in a vane apposite to the context of
this paper:
Based on Freud’s own characterizations of it, the pleasure principle (once placed in
relation to the reality principle) acts like an economic speculator, assessing potential
gains and losses of satisfaction in light of possible outcomes of various courses of action.
It seeks to maximize satisfaction and correspondingly minimize pain/dissatisfaction. In
Freud’s account, the pleasure principle qua economic speculator isn’t so much a function
of the primary processes within the id, but is the strategy wherein the ego negotiates with
the exigencies of reality on behalf of the id (of course, the ego often performs this function
unconsciously). For Lacan, the ego feels pain (in the form of anxiety, symptoms, and the
like) when the homeostatic balance sheet of the pleasure principle is thrown into disorder
by an insistent enjoyment that pays no heed of the speculative gains or losses of a diluted,
sublimated pleasure, of a principle that routinely “sells out” enjoyment in its ongoing
bargaining with its reality-level complement. Jouissance is “beyond the pleasure principle”
precisely to the extent that it breaks off negotiations with the reality principle, that it
bypasses the moderating/mitigating influence of the ego on the drives.6
On the one hand, therefore, the trustee is barred from any chance for enjoyment
or from attempting to grasp das Ding in accordance with the particulars of a trust
arrangement and the law on trusts more generally. On the other, the trustee is
continually tempted or baited by the insistent enjoyment that is at once a
product of the effective performance of their duties and obligations, including,
for example, the financial rewards of prudent investments that trust benefici-
aries rely upon to guarantee their enjoyment. And a traumatic indication of the
fact that they have been obliged to “sell out” their own enjoyment in order to
satisfy the realities of trust law and trusteeship.
The second formulation, albeit one intimately connected with the first,
relates to the internal regulatory or prohibitive psychical mechanisms that
prevent or seek to prevent the subject-as-trustee from pushing past the limit
on enjoyment imposed by the pleasure principle. In particular, how this limit
has been consciously and deliberately recreated in the trust mechanism, and
5 Adrian Johnston, “The Forced Choice of Enjoyment: Jouissance between Expectation and
Actualization,” The Symptom 2 (2002), access November 26, 2015, http://www.lacan.com/for
cedf.htm.
6 Johnston, “The Forced Choice of Enjoyment.”
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by extension the so-called “onerous” duties of the subject-as-trustee, as a
means of preventing a breach of trust.7 Before examining breach of trust
further, however, it is first necessary to consider trusts as more than simply
mechanisms for facilitating beneficial capital growth through investment, but
as intersubjective spaces, engines of desire or a juridical form of the pleasure
principle itself.
3 Constituting intersubjective trusts
There is a basic duality, a product of the historical division between the
jurisdictions of equity and the common law, which inscribes upon trusts a
“double dominion” of legal title and equitable ownership.8 “What is important
about separating the rights to property into legal and equitable ownership
(strictly legal title to the trustee and equitable ownership to the beneficiary),”
claim Pearce, Stevens and Barr, “is that it enables the powers of management
to be split from the beneficial enjoyment” [my emphasis].9 As such, a trust
guarantees or ought to guarantee the beneficiary’s enjoyment, including any
capital accumulations or income streams that flow directly from investments
(the “fruits”). Moreover, as outlined earlier, it is beneficial enjoyment that
reflects the individual beneficiary’s freedom from the ordinary administrative
and managerial burdens that accompany investment funds and property port-
folios in modern capitalist contexts.
A key part of interpreting the existing jurisprudence from the point of view
of psychoanalysis is the split that occurs between the legal and equitable title
which is in turn mirrored by a split between property or fund management and
beneficial enjoyment. It is in this sense that the trust can be said to consciously
and formally recreate the type of unconscious split between demand and
satisfaction that produces the subject’s desire. And a trust arguably achieves
the aims of the pleasure principle, of maximizing satisfaction and correspond-
ingly minimizing dissatisfaction, insofar as it manages to function in exact
accordance with the terms of its constitution, including achieving significant
7 For example, see Sarah Worthington, Equity, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),
74.
8 Robert Pearce, John Stevens, and Warren Barr, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations,
5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 55.
9 Pearce et al., The Law of Trusts, 55.
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gains from investments, far more effectively than the individual subject could
ever hope to. However, in the regular event of dysfunctional trusts in which the
ideal is not achieved, there is revealed an ever present influence of uncon-
scious energies that refuse the trust harmony and plunge the “homeostatic
balance sheet of the pleasure principle” into disorder by an insistent enjoy-
ment that pays no heed of the speculative gains or losses of a diluted,
sublimated pleasure.10
As a product of the trust, jouissance denotes beneficial enjoyment that is
at once expected and also exceeds expectation. Yet jouissance ought not to be
thought of simply as an excess. “Jouissance,” as Daniel Houirgan maintains,
“is a limit-concept and as such stands for the failure of pleasure to meet
the demand for satisfaction […] Jouissance is not and should not be under-
stood as an excess but rather as an excessivity inherent to pleasure’s composite
lack of satisfaction” [my emphasis].11 A beneficiary is by (ideal) definition
expected to enjoy freely within the confines of the trust. Akin to a triggered
intravenous morphine drip, the trust at once produces and satisfies what the
beneficiary demands in a measured form, in terms of either income, capital or
both with little or no input from them. Yet beneficial enjoyment will invariably
remain finite and wholly dependent upon additional variables, most notably
the initial size of the trust fund available for investment and the types of
investment undertaken by the trustees in accordance with the investment
schedule. Therefore, the beneficiary enjoys, but not to a point of excess
(or suffering).
Only in certain circumstances, that will in all likelihood be prohibited by
the trust arrangement or trust law more generally, would a beneficiary seek or
demand something more than or beyond the (partial) enjoyment that the trust
provides.12 That is, seeking an absolute enjoyment that extends beyond the
fantasy of which the trust forms a part. However, this is not fantasy as a de
facto unreal or pretended state of being. The trust as a mechanism for regulat-
ing and channelling the desires of beneficiaries does exist in “reality.”
10 Johnston, “The Forced Choice of Enjoyment.”
11 Daniel Hourigan, “Breach! The Law’s Jouissance in Miéville’s The City & The City,” Law,
Culture and the Humanities, 9.1 (2011): 157.
12 Jonathan Garton suggests that the complicity of beneficiaries in exceeding the limits of the
trust and causing a breach to occur “is a recurrent theme in the history of trustee investment.”
Talking directly to the issue of the evasion of statutory investment lists, Garton claims that
trustees are found to be at fault, “possibly through ignorance but also with the encouragement
and consent of beneficiaries” [my emphasis] (Garton, Trusts Law, 460).
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The trust, in this sense, represents a form of “reality.” But it is not a reality free
of fantasy. Nor is it the reality of, for example, efficient and productive
property management that equity would have us believe. Instead, it is a reality
that is structured and supported by fantasy. Fantasy in this context denotes
what Žižek, following Lacan, defines precisely as a form of “reality” that is a
fantasy-construction, which enables the beneficiary to mask the Real of
their desire.13 Consequently, the trust space helps traverse the fantasy and
for the subject (in trust law these are tellingly called objects) to identify
with the fantasy which, as Slavoj Žižek maintains, “structures the excess
resisting our immersion into daily reality.”14
On this account the trust operates as a mechanism via which the bene-
ficiary is able to escape the traumatic kernel of their Real desire. Trust law
tells us inter alia through a complex of formalities that the beneficiary must
enjoy, but that certain limits to that enjoyment are inevitable and thus must
also be accepted. The trustee on the other hand, employed or nominated in
order to maintain the reality fantasy-construct of the trust, must never strive to
enjoy the fruits of the trust, i. e. must never consider themselves a beneficiary.
Thus, for the beneficiary and trustee alike, and for the latter in particular,
this trust function recalls what Lacan says is at stake between the subject
and jouissance. That is to say, that jouissance is the contravention of defined
and strict limits.15 Moreover, for the trustee in particular, who must
somehow learn to enjoy their lack of enjoyment, this can be further defined
in relation to a mode of suffering that is jouis-sans.16
With the recurrent threat posed by both trustee and beneficiary who seek
absolute enjoyment beyond the fantasy we are able to recognise a more radical
interpretation of the trust. Explicitly, that trusts are ultimately a product of the
desire to transgress a number, if not all, of the conditions required to fully
constitute them. Trusts are engines for the creation and, ideally, the contain-
ment of desires. Captured within the trust mechanism, and thus informing its
13 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 2008) 45; also see: Jacques
Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan
Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1979).
14 Slavoj Žižek, “The Liberal Utopia: Section I – Against the Politics of Jouissance,” (2007),
accessed October 30, 2015, http://www.lacan.com/zizliberal.htm.
15 See: Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959–1960, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans.
Dennis Porter (London: Routledge, 1992).
16 Lorenzo Chiesa, “Lacan with Artaud: j’ouïs-sens, jouis-sens, jouis-sans,” in Lacan: The Silent
Partners (Wo Es War), ed. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 2006), 354.
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very structure, is desire. Moreover, trusts, and most notably those concerned
primarily with investment, embody the desires of the trustee, the settlor and
the beneficiary, all of whom have a vested interest, albeit to varying degrees,
not only in the trust facilitating some benefit, but of maximising benefit and
thus enabling attempts to push beyond the pleasure principle in order to catch
the jouissance of the Other as property, as thing. This formulation will be
examined in more detail later.
It is worth briefly noting that within the contemporary capitalist context the
type of trusts that demonstrate precisely this type of maximisation ethos are also
those that have benefitted from an increasingly liberal regulation regime. Hedge
funds, for example, certainly prior to the financial crash in 2008, typified
investment mechanisms that were almost entirely free from any form of regula-
tory restraint. That were, in a sense, demonstrative of a form of psychosis
predicated on the lowering or removal of any barriers (of the fundamental
fantasy). “According to Lacan,” Chiesa tells us, “the capitalist discourse epito-
mizes perversion precisely in so far as it pre-tends to enjoy real ‘a’ (the lack)
accumulated by jouissance.”17
This, it might be said, corresponds with the morphine addict who is given
a seemingly unlimited supply of their favourite drug with no restraints
imposed upon or monitoring of usage, but who is simultaneously never able
to maintain or recreate the first fix. It is undeniable that this little or entirely
unregulated state of affairs produced, on the one hand, significant financial
rewards for the vast majority of those who used them. But on the other hand,
that lack of regulation – the lack of fantasy-construct able to mask (Real)
desire for inter alia more and riskier investments – directly led to the creation
of the conditions of complaint, namely the financial crisis and the plethora of
regulation forced upon hedge funds by many jurisdictions as a result.18 A point
on which we may query whether or not there is a certain masochism at play in
the field of unconscious desire, which reveals jouissance as the essential
condition (conditio sine qua non) “of the inextricable relationship between
the drive and desire.”19
Whether as small private family settlements or international investment
funds, trusts employ and reply upon demand, satisfaction the resultant desire
of the split between those two, as well as the promise, if not always the
17 Chiesa, “Lacan with Artaud,” 354.
18 Garton, Trusts Law, 456.
19 Chiesa, “Lacan with Artaud,” 354.
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actualization, of enjoyment in order to structure and substantiate themselves.
Trusts, in that sense, precisely describe a dividing-up, distributing and reat-
tributing of everything that counts as jouissance. A mode of division analogous
to what Lacan called “the essence of law.”20 This may well pitch the juridical
significance of trusts too high for the comfort of some. But F.W. Maitland, for
one, claimed not only that the trust was the largest and the most important of
all the exploits of equity, but that “it seems to us almost essential to
civilization.”21
Thus far, we may argue, not only is the juridical significance of the trust
well-placed, but so is the affective, psychological significance of trusts. And one
of the major reasons that trusts do or ought to remain significant in the context
of capitalism is because they allow or rather insist that the subject better know,
understand and manage their perverse and wild desires. They are, in that sense,
mechanisms capable of, if not entirely successful at, taming desire, but also a
more effective way for the subject to attune themselves to powerful psychical
energies and forces that all too often remain unconscious and beyond reason,
namely those pertaining to the pleasure principle. This paints an undeniably
detailed and rich picture of the function and place of trusts in modern society,
and especially as intersubjective sites for the management not only of property,
but also of desire.
4 Desire with breach
Desire, Lacan maintains, is the difference that results from the subtraction of
satisfaction from demand; it is the “very phenomenon of their splitting
(Spaltung).”22 In other words, when a person or persons demand something
they believe will satisfy that demand, yet they are prevented from attaining it
absolutely or at all, desire is the product and the consequence. In the context of
trusts beneficiaries are not the only subjects who demand satisfaction or who
have needs that account for their enjoyment of the trust, the trustee is also a
desiring subject.
20 Jacques Lacan, Encore, 1972–1973, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 3.
21 Maitland, Equity, 23.
22 Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 580.
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The trustee is obligated and thus needs, for example, to ensure that certain
investments will produce a more than reasonable capital return or income for
the trust beneficiaries. This means that trustees also make demands they hope or
strategically plan to have satisfied, and therefore this explains how desire
relates to the trustee in terms of the day-to-day management and administration
of the trust. This recalls Hourigan’s reading of jouis-sans in light of Kant as a
duty to the law (or equity in this instance) as that which is without enjoyment;
and where the trustee as part of the official machinery of trust law must never
exhibit any “heterogeneous” desire or private enjoyment in the course of execut-
ing their duties and obligations.23 Traditionally the office of trustee was
informed by notions of voluntary duty. Trustees did not, therefore, automatically
expect remuneration or pecuniary reward for doing so.24 Whilst the age of the
professional trustee has altered this tradition to a large extent, and in particular
s.28 and Part V of the Trustee Act 2000, it remains a strict rule that trustees must
not seek to enjoy the fruits of their management and administration for their
own benefit. Yet how does this rule reflect the “problem” of containing the
desire of the trustee?
A trustee’s demand that investments be rewarded or satisfied by strong
returns, and beneficial enrichment is therefore a very particular form of bal-
ance that is struck between demand, satisfaction and desire that relates to the
administration of the trust and fulfilment of one’s duties and obligations.
As such, it is not the same as the trustee either desiring, seeking to enjoy or
indeed entirely satisfying their own demands with the fruits which trust law
maintains ought to be exclusively for the beneficiaries. Lacan’s “encore”
can offer an explanation of what drives a trustee to want more than mere or
partial enjoyment that is the product of their legally-mandated satisfaction.25
And thus also an explanation of why the trustee risks allowing their own
enjoyment of the trust to supersede that of the beneficiaries; the trustee
who either consciously or unconsciously directs their unmet or unresolved
energies – their need for more – towards satisfaction in any form, whether
those forms represent legitimate demands sanctioned by the constituted
terms of the trust or not. Here we find a trustee who coincides with
the desiring subject, who, as Bruce Fink maintains, thinks there must be
23 Hourigan, “Breach! The Law’s Jouissance in Miéville’s The City & The City,” 157.
24 Robison v Pett (1734) 3 P. Wms. 249; Re Barber (1886) 34 Ch.D 77; Dale v IRC [1954] AC 11.
25 Lacan, Encore.
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something better; says there must be something better; believes there must be
something better.26 This is a trustee that we find, for example at the centre of
frauds, and whose behaviour, as a result, is construed as morally bad.
The trustee who siphons off or redirects a portion of the fund for themselves,
and continues to do so indefinitely or until such time as they are caught
or admit fault.
Lacan’s reading of Freud suggests that the function of the pleasure principle
is as a good, and as that which “keeps us a long way from our jouissance.”27
Breach of trust, in that sense, marks an instant inscribed in legal time at which
point the pleasure principle is transgressed, the line is crossed and the good
disavowed in a deathly drive for unknowable or obscene jouissance. The sub-
ject-as-trustee in breach seeks an enjoyment unbeknownst but seemingly judged
worth suffering for. Moreover, in pushing beyond the pleasure principle and
unmasking the Real of their desire, the traumatic kernel that lies at the heart of
the social reality of the trust designed to facilitate escape from just such desire, the
subject-as-trustee risks continuation of that suffering for as long as it is bearable to
them. Accordingly there is a definitive temporality that attaches to instances of
breach which acknowledges that equity (law) is in itself broken, breaking up both
time and space and consequently helping to create the gap or cut in the integrity
of the trust in the symbolic; gaps that signal the out-of-jointness, the excessivity,
of trust order that relates to jouissance28
We can find a general example of this moral division, between the good of
the trust as a form in social reality and the bad of disavowing and transgres-
sing that social reality, within both historical and contemporary trusts embo-
died in the pervasive pseudo-religious concept of “temptation.” “The trustees’
obligation is to manage the trust solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries,”
Graham Moffat reminds us, “and if the trustees’ own interests conflict
with theirs, then temptation exists” [my emphasis].29 Here a trustee confronted
with two possible courses of action is tempted by a turbulent and continuous
unconscious desire which leads them inexorably to a breach, rather than
along the course which ensures the integrity of trust. Temptation also reveals
another important aspect which will be dealt with in the following section,
namely the role that choice plays in understanding the conditions that lead a
trustee to breach.
26 Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 2004).
27 Lacan, The Ethics, 185.
28 Hourigan, “Breach! The Law’s Jouissance in Miéville’s The City & The City,” 162.
29 Graham Moffat, Trusts Law, 5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 435.
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5 The inevitable breach of trust
A breach of trust may be deliberate or inadvertent; it may consist of an actual misappro-
priation or misapplication of the trust property or merely of an investment or other dealing
which is outside the trustees’ powers; it may consist of a failure to carry out a positive
obligation of the trustees or merely of a want of skill and care on their part in the
management of the trust property; it may be injurious to the interests of the beneficiaries
or be actually to their benefit.30
One way in which to understand the inherent instability of the trust is that the
trustee is always already pregnant with the desire to breach the trust. The
trustee, as an agent lacking symbolic distance whilst acting or performing in
the symbolic domain of the trust seeks to become or know the very equity of the
trust itself (jouis-sens).31 And if trusts are to be maintained as a legitimate form
in the socio-legal capitalist domain, then it is necessary to contemplate how the
unconscious desire to breach functions as well as how the choice to accept the
form of legal subjectivity known as trusteeship can avoid breach.
Paradoxically and of interest to this article is how this interpretation of
breach of trust may also be capable of disrupting the mainstream deployment
of trusts within capitalist society. That is, how the structure and function of
trusts ought to be emphasized in order to better reflect the vital role that trusts
play in containing and channelling the wild desires that are arguably a feature
of modern capitalist societies. Rather than allowing trusts to be deployed as
mechanisms or vehicles which, whilst still containing and managing desires to
some extent, ultimately allow capitalist subjectivities to actualize more fully by,
for example, facilitating tax avoidance.32 With the consequence that inter alia
the gap between rich and poor is increased, socio-economic inequality is aug-
mented through the preservation of wealth in the hands of the few, and the
possibility of notions of community predicated upon egalitarian values are
diminished or lost.
Dialogue between equity and psychoanalysis on the matter of how best
to understand breach from the point of view of desire is extant but
30 Millett LJ in Armitage v Nurse [1997] 2 All ER 705 at 710.
31 Jacques Lacan, Television, ed. Joan Copjec, trans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss and Annette
Michelson (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1980), 10; Hourigan, “Breach! The Law’s
Jouissance in Miéville’s The City & The City,” 158.
32 See for example Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur
Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 451–452.
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poorly aligned. In other words, the equity’s thinking on breach of trust is
geared largely towards understanding and mitigating economic loss to
beneficiaries – what we are otherwise calling from a psychoanalytical perspec-
tive, loss of enjoyment. Whereas, psychoanalysis attends to the root causes for
a trustee’s desire to breach and is therefore capable of searching beyond mere
concerns for economic loss and the need for restitution, or to place the
beneficiary “in the same position as he would have been had he not sustained
the wrong for which he is now getting the compensation or reparation.”33
In particular, Lacanian notions of conscious and unconscious submission by
the subject-as-trustee to the Other reveals differences between the legal
and psychoanalytical approaches, and produces very different conclusions
as to the reasons underpinning breach.34
To recap, in a conventional sense the demands the beneficiaries will make
and that will require to be satisfied by the trustee, demands which are defined
at least initially by the settlor, necessarily placate any sense of enjoyment that
might otherwise be sought by the trustee. Moreover, duties and obligations
that the trustee holds by virtue of the office also guarantee the grounds for
account and remedy should the trustee seek their own enjoyment of the
property. In short, and in accordance with the fundamental outline of trustee
duties, the trustee must not enjoy, the trustee must simply manage in accor-
dance with the applicable standards set-out for them.35 This conventional
position accords with jouis-sans. But in assuming the position of law-maker
or knowing object of equity through inter alia seeking to enjoy the trust as or
like a beneficiary, the trustee breaches the trust in light of what we have
referred to here as jouis-sens.
Equity has long prescribed and defined those instances of deviation from the
instructions given to a trustee within the four corners of the trust instrument as a
strong signal of a breach, and enforces upon the trustee in such instances a
strict liability for such deviations.36 This aspect of trust jurisprudence betrays the
belief that a lack of trust exists at the heart of the mechanism, or at the very least
a strong expectation that a lack of trust will be realised at some point during the
life of that particular arrangement. If indeed trustees are not to be trusted, and
33 Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns (a firm) [1996] AC 421 at 432.
34 The capitalized “O” of Other represents what Lacan calls the “big Other” or “grand Autre,”
which helps to differentiate it from otherness, or “autre,” which itself represents the “lost
object” or “objet petit a.” See: Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 282.
35 Lord Blackburn in Speight v Gaunt (1883) 9 App. Cas. 1.
36 Worthington, Equity, 130.
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the strict rule concerning liability that equity has over a significant period of
time entrenched reflects this concern, then this would suggest that equity, as
well as psychoanalysis, takes seriously the notion that energies of desire can
and will become directed outside conscious awareness and attach themselves to
the trust which, as a (juridical) idea, represents and facilitates a continuous
unconscious desire that the trustee seeks to enjoy absolutely. The effect of this
being, quite simply, the trustee’s redefinition of the trust limits in contravention
of the settlor’s initial intentions, and thus a choice by the trustee not to submit to
the settlor as Other.
Over the course of many generations of jurisprudential development of
trusts, equity has dealt more effectively with questions of how a breach
occurred, in terms of both evidence and a trustee’s confessional account and
thus which remedy ought to apply, than why it occurred. Or rather, and to be
more forgiving of the general equitable approach, questions of why rarely stray
beyond the confines of administratively expedient categories of individual
standards of behaviour, i. e. those relating to prudence, negligence, reason-
ableness or unconscionability, that, whilst certainly categories in which a
cause for breach might be located, remain ignorant of the influence and
radical interpolation of the unconscious into matters of causality. A ubiquitous
example of the type of conditions that often lead to a breach is whether a
serious possibility of a trustee’s conflict of interest was or could be identified,
either prior to their trusteeship or once the trust was active.37 But these are
manifestly conscious causes. And whilst one might reasonably suggest that a
trustee chooses to follow a particular path of their desire that begins with a so-
called conflict of interest, a deeper analysis of that choice reveals notable
incongruities with the equitable jurisprudence on breach. As such, analysis
of the conditions and causes of the desire to breach and the enjoyment
contingent on that breach, needs to attend not just to the conscious accounts
for breach or pre-existing categories of fault-based behaviour, but on the role
played by the unconscious.
For psychoanalysis the issue turns less upon what is known or can be
readily predicted by equity as to the likelihood of a trustee’s behaviour or
motives within the four corners of the trust instrument. More apposite is the
unconscious desire apprehended in the psychic space of the trustee who is
caught in the frenzied and ecstatic space of the trust. That is, contrapuntal
composition of demands (obligations) made by beneficiaries; the trust
37 For example: Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, and
Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378, [1967] 2 AC 134n.
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instrument; the trustee’s own unconscious; and the corresponding satisfaction
of each of those, which constantly tests the limits and integrity of the fantasy-
construct of reality. Within this heady matrix of split demands and satisfactions
that produces competing desires, the trustee must all the while adhere to
fundamental fiduciary obligations encompassing self-denial and deferment of
self-interest. This is notable, for example, in cases where conflicts of interest are
of concern and the “self-dealing rule” is invoked.38 The fiduciary nature of
trusteeship thus operates in order to deter the spectre of temptation and prevent
transgression of the limit imposed upon the office of trustee. A limit, as we have
already described, which is instituted in order to prohibit the trustee’s drive
towards the jouissance of the trust.
Analysis determines not only that limits exist relative to a trustee’s enjoy-
ment of the trust (equity tells us this as well) – what amounts to a necessary
delineation between principles of reality and pleasure – but that the thing (das
ding) desired by the trustee that resides on the “bad” side of the divide
between reality and pleasure actually makes the trust possible.39 And the
same applies in reverse as well. “I can only know of the Thing,” says Lacan,
“by means of the Law […] the Thing finds a way by producing in me all kinds
of covetousness thanks to the commandment [‘thou shalt not covet it’], for
without the Law the Thing is dead.”40 This “lost object.” or what Lacan
called as a development of Freud’s das ding, the objet petit a, or the object
cause of desire, is precisely the type of formulation capable of examining
beyond mere concerns for economic loss and the need for compensation or
restitution that equity traditionally and conventionally favours in addressing
cases involving a breach.
The lost object, the substitute in fantasy, is a vital cause that can be pointed
to in order to explain why a trustee traverses the limits imposed by the trust.
It is, to all intents and purposes, the thing which a trustee may well describe or
attempt to describe in one form or another (by tracing its outline, so to speak)
when asked to account for a breach. Whether the trustee who accounts for
misappropriating trust property for their own ends, for example, is describing
a substitution (in fantasy) for an object that is “originally lost, which coincides
with its own loss, which emerges as lost,” or whether they are describing
substitution directly for loss itself is open to question.41 In determining the
38 See: Megarry VC in Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] 3 All ER 129 at 241.
39 Lacan, The Ethics, 73.
40 Lacan, The Ethics, 83.
41 Žižek, “The Liberal Utopia.”
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particularity of the objet petit a as such it is important to understand whether the
trustee’s breach was driven by an “impossible” quest for the lost object, or as a
consequence of the direct enactment of the original loss itself – that is, an
enactment instituted in the unconscious by the subject’s cut or distancing
from their original object of desire.
6 Alienation and separation
of the subject-as-trustee
In accordance with trusteeship as the paradigm fiduciary obligation, circum-
venting or ignoring equity’s restriction on personal autonomy will result
in breach of trust.42 This is nothing more than the failure of a trustee to
adhere to the deceptively simple if painful instructions set out in legislation
and case-law as to how trusts ought to operate generally, as well as
the particular demands instituted by the individual trust instrument itself.
Breach of trust not only signals that a trustee has sought their own share
of the surplus enjoyment generated by the trust, however, but that the
breach is also a sine qua non of enjoyment that is obscene. For a trustee to
breach the integrity of the trust is not simply a failure in their administrative
abilities, but an obscene perhaps indecent act that reveals all too human
imperfections.
In order to guard against the temptation to breach, the trustee must
acknowledge castration. More precisely, castration that allows entry into the
symbolic world of the trust through a remittance of jouissance to the Other. Even
though the settlor technically “drops out” of the picture once a trust has been
fully and validly constituted, a powerful fragment of the settlor’s being-in-the-
world, namely their intentions, continue to flow through the operation of the
trust and direct the will and actions of the trustee. In this sense, and although
there is an administrative framework for trusts established by statute and in
case-law that prevails once the settlor has dropped out of the equation, it is the
settlor as ultimate creator of the trust and the reason for the trustees being, who
acts as Other. And it is the trustee’s unwillingness to submit to this Other that
ultimately and arguably establishes grounds for a breach, or proves that breach
is inevitable.
42 Worthington, Equity, 127.
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Further, the subject-as-trustee who breaches, having seemingly accepted
castration as necessary to the office of trustee, latterly seeks to conceal or
disavow the castration in order to try and convince themselves and others that
they continue to have access to unbridled jouissance that circulates outside of
the Other. Correspondingly, the disavowal that underlies the breach supports
the illusion that the trustee has not had to alienate their jouissance, or rather has
chosen not to alienate their jouissance, meaning that they have refused the mode
of legal subjectivity that can reasonably be called “trusteeship.” As a counter-
point to the equity’s definition of the relationship between the trustee and the
settlor, whereby equity says that the settlor “drops out” of the picture once a
trust has been formally and validly constituted therefore, we find via Lacan a
suggestion of quite the opposite. That is, the trustee’s castration, as indicative of
the formal steps taken by the subject towards full acceptance of the office of
trusteeship, involves a form of subjective disappearance. This means that the
subject must themselves drop out of the picture, giving rise to a pure possibility
of being-as-trustee, and in order to become a trustee.43
On this basis trusts and trusteeship are defined by opposing yet not uncom-
plementary ontological conditions. On the one hand the equity maintains that
the settlor does or must materially disappear once the trust has been created,
which leaves the trustee to enact and perform duties and obligations that are in
essence signifiers of the manifest intention and will of the settlor. On the other
hand, presented with a choice as to whether to alienate their jouissance in
confrontation with the Other – what Fink dramatically refers to as “an exclusive
choice between two parties, to be decided by their struggle to the death” – the
subject, in order to accede absolutely and without qualification to a new (or
perhaps true) form of subjectivity represented in the symbolic office of trustee,
must disappear.44 Confronted by the choice of whether to remit jouissance to the
Other-as-settlor, the subject-as-trustee in waiting really has no choice at all. Fink
explains this “forced choice” between the subject and the Other via Lacan’s
concept of separation:
The cause of the subject’s physical presence in the world was a desire for something
(pleasure, revenge, fulfilment, power, immortality, and so on) on the part of the child’s
parents. One or both of them wanted something, and the child results from that wanting.
People’s motivations for having children are often very complex and multi-layered, and a
child’s parents may be very much at odds concerning their motives. One or both parents
43 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995), 51–52.
44 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 51.
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may have not even wanted to have a child at all, or may have wanted only a child of one
particular sex […] If then, alienation consists in the subject’s causation by the Other’s
desire which preceded his or her birth, by some desire not of the subject’s own making,
separation consists in the attempt by the alienated subject to come to grips with that
Other’s desire as it manifests itself in the subject’s world.45
Here we can exchange the trustee for the child in Fink’s account. This helps to
explain one of the main contributions that Lacan is able to make to interpreta-
tions of breach of trust. Moreover it is an interpretation that not so much
contradicts equity’s own ideas (jurisprudence), as enlivens and deepens them.
Key to an understanding of how separation features in the context of the trust,
therefore, is to re-consider the influence on the trustee’s administration and
performance of the trust that is inaugurated by the prevailing desire of the
settlor as it continues to flow through the trust. The trustee, it might be said,
is constantly in the shadow of the settlor.
Following Fink’s interpretation of separation we find that the desire of the
settlor not only creates the trust, but also creates the trustee who must then get
to grips with the settlor’s desire as it manifests itself in and through the trust.
That is, a desire that manifests itself in the subject-as-trustee’s world. More
precisely the subject-as-trustee attempts to get to grips with what is lacking in
the settlor’s desire as it manifests in the trust. The trustee is in this sense
convinced of something that is lacking from the trust, perhaps a particular
instruction of how to deal with the property or which investments to make
that will maximise the potential of the fund. Something which they subse-
quently try to fill with their own desire by assuming intimate knowledge of the
desire of the Other-as-settlor. Moreover, they do so in spite of equity’s insistence
that the trust is valid and that the requisite intention of the settlor is in evidence.
The result of the trustees’ attempts to both claim a lack at the heart of the
settlor’s desire-cum-intention, and then fill that lack, is what equity calls
“breach of trust.”
This formulation accords with what Fink refers to as, “a chimerical, unrea-
lizable moment.”46 Quite simply, the trustee’s attempts to realize and fulfil what
they perceive to be a lack written into the trust instrument, itself a direct
indication of lack in the Other, can never be resolved. It is analogous to a rather
banal and everyday instinct or belief that says one person must know or under-
stand better than another what is required to, for example, maximise the
45 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 50.
46 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 55.
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enjoyment within a given context. And there are many ways such instincts or
beliefs are a fortiori labelled. As self-assurance perhaps, or even arrogance.
Notwithstanding such labels, through breach of trust we are given a demonstra-
tion not only in the conscious and formal enactment of administration and
management standards, but of attempts to contain and regulate desire and
enjoyment.
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